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Abstract
Background: To combat the spread of antimicrobial resistance (AMR), hospitals are advised to screen high-risk
patients for carriage of antibiotic-resistant bacteria on admission. This often includes patients previously admitted to
hospitals with a high AMR prevalence. However, the ability of such a strategy to identify introductions (and hence
prevent onward transmission) is unclear, as it depends on AMR prevalence in each hospital, the number of patients
moving between hospitals, and the number of hospitals considered ‘high risk’.
Methods: We tracked patient movements using data from the National Health Service of England Hospital Episode
Statistics and estimated differences in regional AMR prevalences using, as an exemplar, data collected through the
national reference laboratory service of Public Health England on carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae
(CPE) from 2008 to 2014. Combining these datasets, we calculated expected CPE introductions into hospitals from
across the hospital network to assess the effectiveness of admission screening based on defining high-prevalence
hospitals as high risk.
Results: Based on numbers of exchanged patients, the English hospital network can be divided into 14 referral
regions. England saw a sharp increase in numbers of CPE isolates referred to the national reference laboratory over
7 years, from 26 isolates in 2008 to 1649 in 2014. Large regional differences in numbers of confirmed CPE isolates
overlapped with regional structuring of patient movements between hospitals. However, despite these large
differences in prevalence between regions, we estimated that hospitals received only a small proportion (1.8%) of
CPE-colonised patients from hospitals outside their own region, which decreased over time.
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Conclusions: In contrast to the focus on import screening based on assigning a few hospitals as ‘high risk’, patient
transfers between hospitals with small AMR problems in the same region often pose a larger absolute threat than
patient transfers from hospitals in other regions with large problems, even if the prevalence in other regions is
orders of magnitude higher. Because the difference in numbers of exchanged patients, between and within
regions, was mostly larger than the difference in CPE prevalence, it would be more effective for hospitals to focus
on their own populations or region to inform control efforts rather than focussing on problems elsewhere.
Keywords: Antimicrobial resistance, Infection prevention and control, Regional coordination, Screening strategies,
Carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae, Hospital network
Background
Responsibility for the control and prevention of anti-
microbial resistance (AMR) traditionally lies with indi-
vidual healthcare institutions as they are perceived to be
the main source of transmission. The rationale is that
hospitals that do not invest in infection prevention and
control (IPC) will have a higher prevalence of resistant
bacteria. However, hospitals may receive patients who
acquired resistant bacteria during a stay in another
hospital, as a patient’s colonisation with resistant
bacteria is often associated with previous hospital stay
[1, 2]. Through these shared patients, hospitals are regu-
larly exposed to resistance from surrounding hospitals,
as well as those further afield or overseas.
The movement of resistant bacteria between hospitals
through shared patients has several important ramifica-
tions. First, the exposure to resistance from surrounding
hospitals means that AMR rates of neighbouring hospi-
tals are interdependent, particularly for hospitals that
exchange many patients – high rates in one hospital will
result in multiple introductions to the other [3]. Second,
hospitals receiving many transferred patients, such as
major tertiary referral centres, are at an increased risk of
AMR introductions [3]. A large proportion of these
shared patients are indirectly transferred, with a stay in
the community between discharge from one hospital
and admission to the next [4]. Third, investments in IPC
in one hospital affect its neighbouring hospitals through
a reduction in the threat of AMR introductions and
exposure for their ‘neighbours’ [5]. This also implies that
preferential investments in hospitals that share many pa-
tients with others are more effective than investments in
all hospitals uniformly [6].
The inter-hospital spread of AMR is not just a theoret-
ical concept, as evidenced by numerous hospital network
studies. In particular, the number of patients a hospital re-
ceives from other hospitals, i.e. the weighted in-degree,
correlates well with incidences of healthcare-associated
infections such as Clostridium difficile [7] and methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) [8]. Furthermore,
advanced molecular methods that allow bacterial pop-
ulations to be compared between hospitals show, for
instance, that hospitals exchanging a large number of
patients have similar MRSA populations, with com-
parable frequencies of sequence types [9] and low
levels of genome sequence diversity [10].
The realisation that introductions from other hospitals
may affect within-hospital rates of AMR has prompted
the formation of IPC policies that take account of hos-
pital transfers. The Dutch Working group on Infection
Prevention [11] recommends that patients who have
previously been admitted to a hospital with a ‘current
MRSA outbreak’ should be considered as high risk and
be placed in pre-emptive isolation on admission. More
recently, Public Health England (PHE) published similar
advice concerning carbapenemase-producing Enterobac-
teriaceae (CPE) in their CPE toolkit for hospitals [12],
recommending that patients admitted within the last
12 months to a hospital with a ‘known CPE problem’
should be isolated and screened. The focus on previously
admitted patients to specific hospitals as a high-risk
category is intended to avoid the need for universal
admission screening since, on a relative scale, a greater
number of colonised patients will be identified per 1000
patients screened.
The ability of control strategies categorising hospitals
as high risk to avoid unidentified introductions (and
hence potential onward transmission) in other hospitals
is unclear, as the number of patients that require screen-
ing (and the potential introductions associated with
them) depends on the number of hospitals on the high-
risk list, their AMR prevalence and the number of
patients shared with each recipient hospital. The goal of
this study was to investigate the relationship between
the structure of hospital networks (due to patient move-
ments) and potential AMR introductions in order to
inform how hospitals should address the increasing
number of AMR threats likely to arise over the next dec-
ade. We used the current, most pressing AMR concern
of CPE as an exemplar for the possible regional differ-
ences in prevalence. We tracked patient movements, es-
timated local and regional CPE prevalence in England
using the available surveillance data and, using these,
calculated the expected introductions into each region
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to identify the largest CPE threats and assess the ability
of admission screening on the basis of high-prevalence
hospitals to prevent CPE introductions.
Methods
Hospital network structure
We calculated the ‘distance’ between hospitals in terms of
patient movements (i.e. the number of times an inpatient
is discharged from one hospital and then admitted to
another) in the English National Health Service (NHS), to
determine the most likely hospital-to-hospital transmis-
sion routes for pathogens such as CPE. We counted the
number of exchanged in-patients between all pairs of
hospitals (Fij) in the English NHS Hospital Episode Statis-
tics (HES) for the financial year 2013–2014.
These patient exchanges could be direct transfers or
indirect movements, where patients were discharged
from one hospital to the general community and admit-
ted to another hospital at a later time point that year.
Using 1 year of HES data minimises variation in
exchanged patients due to changes in the healthcare
system structure. Throughout the analysis, we only
included acute care hospital trusts and excluded any
primary care, mental health or specialist trusts. Referral
regions were defined based on transfers between these
acute care hospital trusts, using a community assign-
ment algorithm that maximises the modularity of the
network [13]. Because these referral regions were de-
fined based purely on the structure of the inter-hospital
patient movement pathways, they do not necessarily
overlap with administrative regions.
CPE rates
As an approximate estimate of CPE prevalence, we used
data collected through the national reference service of
PHE’s Antimicrobial Resistance and Healthcare Associ-
ated Infections Reference Unit between 2008 and 2014.
Clinical laboratories refer potential CPE isolates on a
voluntary basis for confirmation and characterisation;
there is no benchmarking or penalty from submitting
isolates. There is no mandatory surveillance scheme for
CPE in the UK, so these data were the best available on
what is currently one of the largest AMR threats facing
high-income countries. For each isolate, the reference la-
boratory determined the bacterial species and any carba-
penem resistance mechanism found, and recorded the
date of isolate receipt, the sampled source of the isolate
(e.g. blood, sputum, rectal swab) and the sending labora-
tory. We coupled each sending laboratory to a hospital
based on laboratory name and/or geographical location,
or to a group of hospitals if it served a regional function.
We categorised isolates by the carbapenemase family
(KPC, OXA-48-like, NDM, VIM and IMP enzymes), ir-
respective of bacterial species, as CPE outbreaks may
involve transposable-element-mediated spread of resist-
ance genes across multiple species [14].
We calculated the CPE prevalence among discharged
patients as the number of confirmed CPE isolates (Nr)
per 100,000 patient admission episodes (Ar), thus using
the incidence of confirmed isolates as a direct approxi-
mation of within patient population prevalence. We
therefore assumed that any patient that was found to be
CPE positive during its hospital stay was still colonised
at discharge (and during a subsequent admission), as
decolonising CPE positive patients is not advised (and is
very difficult) [12].
We approximated the CPE prevalence (Ir,j), both per
resistance mechanism and for all CPE isolates for each
region (j) defined as above. Admissions were determined
using the in-patient admission records from the NHS-
HES for the financial year 2013–2014, with Ar,j = ∑h ∈ Hr
Ah, where Hr is the set of hospitals in region j.
See Additional file 1 for further details.
Expected introductions
The number of admitted patients potentially colonised
with CPE depends on the previous admission history of
each newly admitted patient and the CPE prevalence in
the hospitals they have visited. As CPE prevalence in
most hospitals was low, to increase reliability in this ex-
emplar, we considered the regional prevalence as the
best approximation of the prevalence in all hospitals in
the referral region. For each referral region, the number
of expected introductions from all referral regions was
calculated as Pi = ∑j Fji x Ir,j, where Fji is the connected-
ness between region j and i. We estimated the propor-
tion of introductions from hospitals outside the region,
from other hospitals within the region, and from the
same hospital to determine the risk each posed to an in-
dividual hospital, and the effectiveness of import screen-
ing of patients from them, and related this to current
guidance to focus screening only on ‘high-risk’ hospitals.
Screening
We calculated the number of screens that would need to
be performed if patients were selected based on previous
admission to a ‘high-risk’ hospital using NHS-HES ad-
missions during the financial year 2013–2014. We used
three scenarios to trigger screening upon admission, (1)
previous admission to the most-affected trust in the
Manchester referral region, as a candidate of a single
hospital that can be expected to be assigned as ‘high
risk, (2) previous admission to any hospital in the
Manchester referral region, to reflect a more diligent
approach assigning an entire region, and (3) previous
admission to any hospital in the London referral regions,
to test the effect of including a region that consists of
many hospitals.
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Results
All hospitals in England were connected in one large
network formed by patient movements (Fig. 1a), with a
clear clustered structure. This network was divided into
14 groups of hospitals, denoted referral regions, using a
standard community detection algorithm [13]. Hospitals
within each region exchanged many more patients with
each other than with hospitals in other regions (Fig. 1b).
Despite the fact that these referral regions were purely
based on the number of exchanged patients, hospitals
within each referral region were geographically clustered
(Fig. 1c). We therefore named the referral regions ac-
cording to the largest city in each.
The number of CPE isolates confirmed by the national
reference laboratory increased sharply in all regions over
2008–2014 (Fig. 2) for all carbapenemase families, with
KPC, NDM and OXA-48-like enzymes comprising most
submitted isolates. Most of the clusters of confirmed
isolates, signifying possible outbreaks, were confined to
single hospitals (Additional file 1: Figure S1). However, a
small number of apparent multi-institutional outbreaks
were observed, the most obvious example of which was
an outbreak of KPC-producers affecting hospitals in the
Manchester referral region. Although the exact number
of isolates from this referral region may have been
higher due to the apparent stronger screening efforts
(Additional file 1: Table S1), this regional outbreak
contributed the vast majority of KPC-positive isolates
confirmed by the reference laboratory (Additional file 1:
Figure S1).
These outbreaks were clearly visible in the geographical
differences in both the CPE prevalence (Fig. 3a–c,
Additional file 1: Figures S2–5) and the prevalent carbape-
nemases (Fig. 3d), with both NDM and OXA-48-like
concentrated around London and the South and most
KPC-positive CPE present in the North-West and the
North. Despite its size, the Manchester outbreak has, to
date, been largely confined to its own referral region,
with far fewer confirmed isolates submitted from the
Lancashire (n = 32) and Liverpool (n = 34) referral re-
gions despite their proximity in the referral network
(Fig. 1b).
If the most affected hospital in the Manchester region
was the only trust on the high-risk list nationally, we es-
timated that 52,438 patients would need to be screened
each year if the CPE toolkit recommendations (Table 1)
were fully implemented; of these, 42,431 (80.9%) were
newly admitted to other hospitals within the Manchester
Fig. 1 The structure of the patient referral network. a The network of all hospitals (dots) connected by exchanged patients (lines, darker lines
indicating more exchanged patients) shows a clear regional structure. b The hospital network depicted by a neighbour-joining tree. The hospitals
within each referral region exchange, with many more patients than hospitals in different regions. c The geographical distribution of the referral
regions, based on the catchment populations of the hospitals
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referral region. The same pattern was observed focussing
on patients from hospitals in other referral regions with
elevated CPE prevalence, such as London, where 88.8%
(666,909) of the 750,939 patients eligible for screening
(according to toolkit recommendations) were newly ad-
mitted to other hospitals within the London region.
The difference in the number of patients who would
need to be screened from within and outside the referral
region is a direct reflection of the referral patterns.
Because this difference in patient flow (Fig. 4a) is larger
than the difference in prevalence (Fig. 4b), most hospi-
tals can expect the majority of CPE introductions they
experience to come through patients moving directly or
indirectly from hospitals within their own referral re-
gions (Fig. 4c). This effect was observed for hospitals in
all regions, despite the large differences in prevalence be-
tween them. Hospitals in the Manchester referral region,
for instance (Fig. 4, red dots), submitted 17 times more
isolates per admission than hospitals in Lancashire, their
closest neighbour in the patient referral network, yet only
contributed 16.2% of the expected CPE introductions to
Lancashire hospitals over 2008–2014 (Fig. 5a). Overall,
89.5% of expected introductions originated from the same
hospital, 8.7% from the same referral regions, and the
remaining 1.8% from other referral regions.
Generally, the number of patients received from hospi-
tals inside the referral region, including those patients pre-
viously admitted to the index hospital, was a hundred-fold
greater than the number received from hospitals outside
the region. If only patients coming from other hospitals
within the region are considered, thus excluding readmis-
sions from the same hospitals, there was still a ten-fold
difference between the patient flow within and between
regions (Additional file 1: Figure S6). The prevalence in
other regions therefore needed to be two orders of magni-
tude higher than within the region for cross-regional in-
troductions to be equal to the introductions from within
the region (Additional file 1: Figure S6).
Finally, we considered how the interplay between preva-
lence and patient movements varied over time as the new
AMR threat became entrenched. As the CPE prevalence
in all regions increased over time (Fig. 2), the relative im-
portance of introductions from hospitals outside the refer-
ral region in fact decreased (Fig. 5). Considerable numbers
Fig. 2 The incidence of confirmed carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) isolates per 100,000 admissions, for England by resistance
mechanism (large panel), and the total incidence of confirmed CPE isolates per referral regions in England (small panels), 2008–2014
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of expected introductions from other referral regions were
only seen initially in regions with a low CPE prevalence at
that time (e.g. Southampton) or that bordered a region
with high CPE prevalence (e.g. Lancashire). The strong
influence of the increasing within-regional prevalence
therefore makes cross-region screening less effective as
time goes by.
Discussion
To combat the spread of AMR, hospitals are advised to
screen high-risk patients for carriage of antibiotic-resistant
bacteria on admission to limit opportunities for onward
transmission. One commonly used risk factor is previous
admission to a hospital with a known resistance problem,
such as a current outbreak, or high endemic prevalence of
resistant organisms. Screening patients from such ‘high-
risk’ hospitals will identify the largest proportion of colo-
nised patients per screened patient because of the greater
relative prevalence in ‘high-risk’ hospitals. However, in
terms of the risk of introduction and subsequent transmis-
sion to new patients, it is the absolute number of colo-
nised patients received by a hospital which determines the
chance of other patients becoming colonised. For ex-
ample, if 50% of two patients received from a high-risk
hospital are colonised, this one patient poses a lower on-
ward transmission risk if unidentified than 1% colonised
patients out of 1000 patients previously admitted to the
same hospital (10 patients). The structure of the patient
Fig. 3 The geographical distribution of carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae isolates per resistance mechanism, calculated as the number of
confirmed isolates per 100,000 hospital admissions (a–c) based on Hospital Episode Statistics data for 2013–2014. Clear differences can be discerned
between mechanisms, with high prevalence of KPC and high OXA-48-like prevalence in different parts of the North-West. d The geographical
distribution of the majority carbapenemase (colours) reflects both single hospital outbreaks as well as multi-institutional outbreaks, such as in the
Manchester and Lancashire referral regions
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referral network dictates that not all hospitals pose an
equal risk to others because patient exchanges are
not randomly distributed. As larger outbreaks are
more likely to draw more attention, even if they
occur further away, this can result in a discrepancy
between the perceived and actual risk of receiving
colonised patients.
To illustrate this, we considered, as an exemplar, CPE
introductions into NHS hospital trusts in different referral
regions in England. Substantial increases in CPE over the
period 2008–2014 reflect what would be expected for a
new AMR threat, particularly one initially predominantly
confined to healthcare settings. Overall, CPE has made
alarming gains in England over the last decade, with many
cases forming part of larger clusters as opposed to individ-
ual introductions. Although many of the single CPE iso-
lates found in various hospitals may still be the result of
introductions from abroad [15, 16], the spread of CPE
within English hospitals is gaining importance in the over-
all epidemiology. Our results should therefore be broadly
generalisable to future AMR threats.
In contrast with the common practice of import
screening based on assigning a few hospitals as high risk,
we found that transfer of patients between hospitals with
small AMR problems in the same region often pose a
larger threat in terms of absolute numbers of colonised
patients admitted to a hospital than transfer of patients
from hospitals in other regions, even if the prevalence of
AMR in the other regions is orders of magnitude higher.
A B C
Fig. 4 The number of patients received from each of the regions (a) multiplied by the prevalence in these regions (b) gives the total number of
expected introductions into the current region (c). The difference in absolute number of expected introductions between regions is driven by
patient flow, even if the relative prevalence differs considerably across the regions. a The number of patients received per region, from the same
hospital (solid blue dots), other hospitals in the same region (open blue dots), hospitals in each of the other regions (grey dots), and hospitals in the
Manchester region (red dots). b The prevalence of confirmed carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE) isolates in each region. c The
expected CPE introductions per region. The example of the Manchester regions (in red) shows that the difference in absolute number of expected
introductions between regions is primarily driven by patient flow, even if the relative prevalence differs considerably across the regions
Table 1 The number of patients to be screened per year, defined
by the number of patients previously admitted to a ‘hospital with
a known carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (CPE)
problem’ extracted from the Hospital Episode Statistics, under
a number of assumed definitions of ‘problem hospitals’,
readmissions to the same hospital were excluded
Hospitals with ‘known
CPE problem’ defined as:
Screening patients
admitted to:
Patients to be
screened/year
Most affected Manchester hospital All other hospitals 52,958
In same region 42,431
Outside region 10,527
All hospitals in the Manchester
referral region
All other hospitals 228,575
In same region 192,613
Outside region 35,962
All hospitals in both London
referral regions
All other hospitals 750,939
In same region 666,909
Outside region 84,030
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This means that, with the current pattern of hospital re-
ferrals, the closeness of other hospitals is a much greater
driver for the spread of antibiotic-resistant bacteria than
their AMR prevalence. As a rule of thumb, for any given
referral region, the prevalence of AMR in another
referral region needs to be at least 100-times higher to
contribute substantially to the admission of patients
colonised with antibiotic-resistant bacteria; equivalently,
without knowledge of the regional structure, hospitals
which share most patients pose a greater threat than
those with the greatest prevalence, unless there are
marked disparities in prevalence.
An outbreak of KPC-positive Enterobacteriaceae limited
to hospitals in the Manchester referral region demon-
strated the multi-institutional component of CPE dispersal,
largely driven through patient movements. The observa-
tion that hospitals in the Liverpool referral region were less
affected by KPC-positive bacteria, despite their geograph-
ical proximity to Manchester, illustrated the lower risk of
cross-regional introduction. Screening of relatively few pa-
tients could therefore potentially be used to mitigate inter-
regional spread at the start of an outbreak, although our
results suggest this would become less effective with time.
Such compartmentalisation only prolongs the time to a
successful introduction [17] because the chance remains
that the admission of one undetected colonised patient
may seed a new outbreak. Any inter-regional screening
efforts should therefore always be accompanied by intra-
regional or hospital-specific control efforts as our results
show that this is often the most likely initial source of re-
sistant micro-organisms.
Several studies have highlighted the necessity of coord-
inating IPC activities within regions [18], often building
on the structure of the patient referral network [19–21].
This can, for example, be done by sharing information
about the colonisation status of patients between health-
care institutions, through centralised registers [22] or by
patient held cards [23], alerting hospitals to take appro-
priate action to prevent onward transmission and saving
money from unnecessary repeated screening. Regional
coordination may also aid effective contact tracing in
outbreaks that span multiple institutions. Our study
shows that it is essential for hospitals to get an up-to-
date overview of the true prevalence of CPE, or AMR in
general, in their surrounding hospitals to estimate the
risks they pose through shared patients. The improved
sharing of prevalence estimates, for instance obtained
through periodic point-prevalence surveys for AMR, be-
tween all healthcare trusts, and in particular those refer-
ring many patients, should therefore be promoted.
Fig. 5 The number of expected introductions over time, based on the prevalence in each referral region in 2014, and the number of transferred
patients from each region, showing all patients colonised at admission, with the expected proportion admitted from other regions (grey) and
highlighting the contribution of patients coming from the Manchester referral region (red). The remaining proportion (blue) of received colonised
patients (up to 100%) were previously admitted to hospitals in the same referral region, including the same hospital. Red/blue dashed bars are
shown for the Manchester region (*), because patients from the same region and those from the Manchester region are the same
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We did not find evidence that the increase in CPE
over the last decade was due to large-scale breakdowns
in IPC standards, again suggesting our results should be
broadly applicable to new AMR threats arising on a
background of ongoing IPC efforts. The single isolates
or small outbreaks of CPE affecting hospitals throughout
the country represented many carbapenemase types, but
hospitals with longer outbreaks usually only ‘suffered’
from a single dominant carbapenemase and did not have
parallel outbreaks involving multiple carbapenem resist-
ance mechanisms despite what appears to be continuous
new exposures. However, it is possible that temporary
lapses in IPC give any AMR threat the opportunity to
spread unseen after introductions, giving rise to larger
outbreaks and highlighting the importance of continued
vigilance. Moreover, the length of some of these out-
breaks indicate that they may be hard to eradicate once
established. This could be caused by colonised patients
returning to hospital, thus reintroducing the bacteria re-
peatedly, or the establishment of environmental AMR
reservoirs within the hospital.
The main study limitation is that we were only able
to approximate the prevalence of our exemplar, CPE,
since data came from a voluntary system of submitting
isolates to a reference laboratory and reporting rates
may differ considerably between hospitals and over
time as screening efforts change depending on the per-
ceived problem. However, firstly, the overall increase in
CPE nationally is unlikely to be solely the result of
changes in screening practice, and regional differences
in the occurrence of the different resistance mecha-
nisms should not be affected. Secondly, it is likely that
hospitals with a known CPE problem, such as those in
the Manchester referral region, engaged in a more ac-
tive search for possible colonised patients, apparent
from the higher proportion of isolates originating from
rectal swabs, and therefore submitted relatively more
isolates. If anything, this would have caused the differ-
ences between regions and the effect of reported prob-
lems further away to be over-estimated, which means,
in turn, that the contributions from hospitals within
the referral region are probably even greater than we
estimate. Finally, the goal of this study was to investi-
gate the interplay between hospital networks and rec-
ommendations for dealing with new AMR threats that
have generally focussed on screening patients from
‘high-risk’ hospitals because of their greater relative
prevalence. We investigated CPE only as an exemplar
of such a new infection threat – our conclusions do not
depend on the specific organism, only on variation in
prevalence across regions and changes in its distribu-
tion being broadly what one would anticipate from a
new AMR threat, and the main current method of
transmission being hospital based.
Our calculations were based on the structure of the
inter-hospital patient referral pathways. This implicitly
assumes that, for the organism in question, community
spread of AMR occurs rarely, and leaves out other
healthcare facilities, such as long-term care facilities or
nursing/residential homes. If community acquisition be-
comes an important part of the dispersal mechanisms,
the regional referral networks may become less mean-
ingful, since community acquisition would impose an
additional relatively uniform probability of introduction
on each hospital, diluting the effect of import screening
from other hospitals, irrespective of how far away they
are in the network. However, it is likely that contact pat-
terns between patients in other healthcare institutions,
or other social structures or community interactions,
reflect the structure of the patient referral pathways.
Furthermore, the observed regional differences in CPE
resistance mechanisms do suggest that, at present, the
dispersal of this AMR threat is primarily taking place
within the healthcare regions.
We were unable to estimate the introductions by pa-
tients previously admitted to foreign hospitals due to the
lack of reliable admission numbers. However, it is unlikely
that the number of admissions from abroad would surpass
the number of admissions from other regions in England.
We would therefore tentatively suggest that the same con-
clusion applies to patients from abroad, namely that the
number of introductions from abroad only contributes
considerably if the prevalence within the region is orders of
magnitude lower than the prevalence in the other country.
While we treated all exchanged patients as being
equally likely to be colonised, the risk of colonisation
will differ depending the ward/unit they were admitted
to and/or their underlying health status. Although this
may alter the exact risk posed by exchanged patients,
the risk posed by far away hospitals relative to neigh-
bouring hospitals is unlikely to increase dramatically if
patient-specific risks are taken into account given the
large difference in patient flows within and between
regions. Adjusting the screening policy to differentiate
patients based on the ward of current admission might
be feasible [24], however, it would be more difficult to
rely on information about the visited ward during the
previous hospital visit.
Conclusions
The dispersal of AMR, particularly CPE, calls for imme-
diate concerted action. To combat AMR effectively, IPC
measures need to be coordinated, as it is no longer a
problem for single hospitals but of the entire healthcare
system. We have shown that it is important to control
the dispersal of AMR on a local or regional level, rather
than focussing on large problems far away, because the
expected absolute number of colonised patients received
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from hospitals within the region is often far greater than
those received from other regions, even if the prevalence
in those regions is orders of magnitude higher. The
primary concern in the assessment of the risk posed by
each hospital, needed to inform IPC measures, is the
availability of reliable data on AMR prevalence in each
hospital. Hospitals should therefore be encouraged to
undertake periodic point-prevalence surveys for AMR in
general, and CPE in particular, to estimate their true
prevalence, and to share this information with the other
hospitals in their referral region.
Additional file
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